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Abstract 
 
Stated preference approaches are widely used in non-market valuation. However, 
their potential uses extend far beyond valuation. In particular they can be used to 
assess efficiency of resource allocations and to design optimal resource allocations. 
Changes to the government budget were evaluated using a choice experiment. 
Results indicate potential efficiency gains from reallocation of the budget to items 
with higher marginal utility. In particular, New Zealand residents want more 
spending on health, education and the environment, with health spending 
consistently having the highest marginal benefits. People want less government 
money spent on income support. The choice experiment was able to identify the 
impacts of demographic factors. Young people rated spending on the environment 
and education more highly than other respondents.  
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Introduction 
 
The median voter theorem states that political parties pursue policies that maximize 
the net benefit of the median voter (Parkin, 1993). Public choice theory espouses the 
view that in a representative democracy competition among politicians ensures that 
the public sector bureaucracy responds efficiently to voters' desires (Turnbull & 
Chang, 1998). Yet public rallies and intense debates in the media suggest that 
allocations might diverge from public preferences. Investigation of such potential 
divergences requires adoption of appropriate research methods. The purpose of this 
paper is to report on an initial application of a method that addresses some of the 
limitations in existing methods. 
 
Ideally, a budget evaluation method needs to satisfy several evaluative criteria. It 
should register strength of preference in order to indicate the relative magnitude of 
benefits from allocating additional budget to specific items, or transferring budget 
between items. The approach also should be capable of identifying how much money 
to allocate to individual budget items, how big the total budget should be, and the 
optimal allocation over all items in the budget. Furthermore, evaluation methods 
should minimise response biases. 
 
Three broad approaches have been used to study central government budget 
allocations. Some authors have used an approach that asks survey respondents to 
indicate whether it is desirable for the government to spend more, the same or less 
money (MSL) on particular budget items (Ferris, 1983; Lewis & Jackson, 1985). A 
similar approach asks survey participants to play a budget game either to design a 
government budget (de Groot & Pommer, 1989; Kemp, 2003), or to allocate changes 
in the government budget, within a given set of specified constraints (Blomquist et 
al., 2000, 2003; de Groot & Pommer, 1989; Israelsson & Kriström, 2001). 
Psychological approaches have used either magnitude estimation or category rating 
to evaluate benefits of public spending. Kemp, who pioneered these approaches, 
prefers category rating (Kemp, 2002). Category rating asks survey participants to 
score item benefits on a zero to ten scale, with a score of zero indicating no benefits 
whatsoever. Psychological approaches can be applied to measure total benefits 
provided by a service, or to measure marginal benefits from small changes in budget 
allocations (Kemp, 1998, 2003; Kemp & Burt, 2001; Kemp, Lee & Fussell, 1995; 
Kemp & Willetts, 1995a). 
 
The MSL approach has the advantage of simplicity, both in survey design and for 
survey participants when constructing their responses. Its main limitations are that it 
does not convey strength of preference nor does it indicate the amount of change 
wanted by the public. It can neither identify the optimal size of the government 
budget, nor the optimal allocation of that budget between competing items. 
 
Budget games yield more information than MSL, but are more difficult for 
respondents – particularly if they are required to maintain a balanced budget. It is 
always possible to infer MSL results from unconstrained budget game outcomes. 
Marginal budget games provide some information on strength of preference, but do 
not identify the optimal total budget or the best allocation of that budget. Budget 
games that identify optimal budgets do not provide policy guidance for marginal 
changes. Consequently, budget games are useful within the specified rules of the 
game, but may offer little useful information for other proposed changes. For 
example, a game that allows the total budget to vary and does not place constraints 
on the magnitudes of changes in particular items may be of little use in evaluating 
how to disburse (say) a $10 million budget increase in which spending on any single 
item is not permitted to decrease.  
 
Category rating is not able to identify optimal budget allocations. In evaluating 
marginal changes, category rating can be used to rank benefits from alternative 
expenditure categories, but it does not provide cardinal estimates of marginal rates of 
substitution because of the different ways that individuals use the evaluative scale.  
 
It is possible that spending on some items is viewed negatively, at least by some 
people. For example, pacifists may view defence spending as undesirable. Even 
when government provision of a particular service is valued positively in total, it 
could still be valued negatively at the margin. MSL and unconstrained budget 
allocation games allow these situations to be signalled. In applications to date, 
category ratings have been undertaken using a scale that is anchored at the bottom 
end by zero, with the instruction that a score of zero indicates no value. Registering a 
negative value is not permitted by this scale. 
 
In reallocating their budgets, governments can choose either to make small changes 
designed to move towards better outcomes, or to make large scale reallocations 
designed to deliver an optimal allocation that equates marginal utilities for all items. 
Evaluating these two types of changes requires different information. The latter 
process is best served by budget games that do not restrict allocations to particular 
categories, but it cannot be informed adequately by MSL or category rating. Small 
budget changes can be evaluated by any of these approaches, but are best informed 
by budget games and category rating, which rank marginal benefits. 
 
None of the existing methods meets all evaluative criteria, suggesting the desirability 
of developing new methods. Choice experiments have been widely applied in the 
marketing, transport and environmental arenas. They belong to the family of conjoint 
methods, also known as attribute based methods, that present alternative products or 
policies that differ on a number of attributes and ask people to reveal their 
preferences by ranking or scoring alternatives. Choice experiments make the lowest 
cognitive demands of the conjoint-based approaches because they entail revelation 
only of the single most preferred alternative. 
 
Choice experiments produce utility functions that allow measurement of marginal 
rates of substitution. Marginal utilities are not constrained to be positive. Because 
choice experiment utility functions need not be linear, choice experiments have the 
potential to inform decisions both at the margin and about optimal budget allocations 
based on the results of a single study. The purpose of the study reported here was to 
use a simple choice experiment to investigate whether the outcomes of the political 
process for central government budget allocation in New Zealand diverge 
significantly from community values. The choice experiment sought to identify 
public preferences for the allocation of New Zealand government monies and to 
address the efficiency of taxing citizens more (or less) to accommodate changed 
provision of government services.  
 
Choice Experiment Method 
 
Choice modelling can be thought of as mimicking a political process. Participants are 
given several options (alternatives) from which they must pick a single best 
alternative. Based on the tenets of random utility theory, the chosen option is 
assumed to have higher expected utility for the respondent than any other option 
presented to them. If sufficient information is available on people’s choices, it is 
possible to use statistical methods to derive estimates of coefficients in a utility or 
preference function that describes how people made those choices (Bennett and 
Blamey, 2001; Louviere et al., 2000). Once the utility function has been estimated it 
is a straightforward matter to estimate the rate at which people are willing to trade off 
attributes.   
 
In March 2002 a self-completed survey seeking perceptions of the state of the New 
Zealand environment was mailed to 2000 randomly selected people registered on the 
New Zealand electoral roll (Hughey et al., 2002). After accounting for known non-
delivered surveys, a 45% response rate (n=836) was obtained.  A choice experiment 
was included in this omnibus survey. The four items addressed in the choice 
experiment were health, education, income support, and conservation & 
environmental management. The total budget for these four items could vary, which 
would directly influence taxes, as could the allocation of the budget between items. 
 
The stated preference question provided survey participants with three options for the 
allocation of government expenditure between the four budget items. Information 
was provided on public spending on these items in 2001. The levels of spending on 
each item defined the options. For any item, spending could be unchanged, could 
increase by $50 million per year, or could decrease by $50 million per year. There 
was no requirement to balance the budget, so it was possible to have options that 
entailed total budget changes across the range ±$200 million. In order to allocate 
alternatives to treatments, nine trials were identified (following Hahn and Shapiro, 
1966) for the case of 4 variables taking 3 levels each. These trials were used as 
starting points in a shifted-triple design to obtain sets of three alternatives. Each 
participant faced only one choice question. Survey participants were asked to 
identify the single option that they preferred, signalling the combination of budget 
items that yielded the highest expected utility. The status quo was not an option. 
Figure 1 illustrates a representative choice question. 
 
Figure 1: Choice question 
Diminishing marginal utilities imply that utility functions are not linear. Indeed, 
internal solutions to the budget allocation exercise require a non-linear utility 
function. However, over small changes in the levels of budget items it is possible to 
approximate the utility function using a linear form. The range over which the 
The New Zealand government spends about $36 billion each year on a range of public services. 
 
Suppose the government were thinking about changing the amount it spent on health, education, income 
support and conservation and environmental management. Any increase in total spending on these 
items would result in a tax increase, but reduced spending could lower taxes. You are asked for your 
opinion on the following options. You might think there are better options than these ones, but they are 
the only options you can choose from for now. Which option do you prefer? 
 
Area of public spending Approximate 
amount spent 
in 2001 
 ($ million) 
Change in spending each year ($ million) 
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Health $7,000 m. $50 m. less no change $50 m. more 
Education $6,733 m. $50 m. less $50 m. more no change 
Income support $13,000 m. $50 m. less $50 m. more no change 
Conservation and 
environmental 
management 
$500 m. $50 m. less no change $50 m. more 
Change in total taxes collected $200 m less $100 m 
more 
$100 m 
more 
 
 I like option 1 best 
 I like option 2 best 
 I like option 3 best 
proposed budget changes deviate from the current budget allocations is small (10% 
for conservation and less than 1% for the other items), indicating the appropriateness 
of linear approximations to the utility function. 
  
The underlying linear utility function is: 
U = 1X1 + 2X2 + 3X3+ 4X4 + 5TAX = X (1) 
 Where TAX = X1+X2+X3+X4 
 
TAX is the total cost of spending on the four items included in the choice 
experiment. Items other than those addressed in equation (1) also influence utility, 
but since expenditures on other budget items and their influence on taxes do not vary, 
they are suppressed in (1). 
 
The vector  identifies marginal utilities. Because tax is a linear function of the other 
parameters, it is redundant in the utility function (2).  
U = (1+5)X1 + (2+5)X2 + (3+5)X3 + (4+5)X4 (2) 
 
Consequently, it is not possible to identify (1), or to retrieve . Because parameter 
estimates from the multinomial logit model are unique only up to a scale factor, 
fixing the marginal utility of money at unity (i.e. 5 = -1) does not solve this 
identification problem. However, it is possible to identify (3). 
U = 1X1 + 2X2 + 3X3 + 4X4 = X (3) 
Where i  = i+5 
 
Each i is net marginal utility of spending on item i, which includes the benefits 
obtained from spending on the item, as well as the disutility of paying higher taxes 
required to fund that additional spending. This is the model fitted to the data. 
 
Results 
 
Results for linear utility functions estimated with the multinomial logit model are 
reported in Table 1. Model A is the simplest model, incorporating only the direct 
effects of the individual budget items. The remaining models relax this restriction, 
incorporating individual-specific attributes in the utility function. 
 
These models have moderate predictive ability, and the core independent variables 
are highly significant. The coefficients on income support in Models A and B are 
negative and highly significant, indicating that people prefer reduced spending on 
income support. Coefficients on the other three budget items are all significantly 
positive, indicating a desire for increased spending on those items. 
 
Table 1: Estimated models 
  
Model A 
 
Model B 
 
Model C 
 
Model D 
Health 1.088 E-2*** 1.104 E-2*** 1.159 E-2*** 1.163 E-2*** 
Education 8.259 E-3*** 8.348 E-3*** 2.200 E-2*** 2.222 E-2*** 
Support -6.996 E-3*** -7.385 E-3*** -2.472 E-2*** -2.460 E-2*** 
Environment 6.859 E-2*** 1.290 E-2*** 1.749 E-2*** 2.137 E-2*** 
Age*Education   -2.585 E-4*** -2.635 E-4*** 
Age*Support   3.361 E-4*** 3.353 E-4*** 
Age*Environment  -2.005 E-4*** -2.734 E-4*** -2.782 E-4*** 
NZ Born*Environment  5.237 E-3** 4.801 E-3*  
McFadden’s R2 0.096 0.110 0.134 0.130 
 
Marginal utility from health spending appears to be relatively uniform across all 
ages, whereas the relative benefits from spending on income support increase with 
age and benefits from spending on education and the environment decline with age, 
and at similar rates. New Zealand born respondents perceive greater value from 
environmental spending than do others, although this effect is of marginal 
significance. 
 
Economic modelling 
 
The ultimate benefit of developing models of utility dependent on government 
spending is that alternative policies may be evaluated. This section considers two 
policy options for funding additional expenditure on any budget item are: 
1) Raise taxes to pay for additional spending on item i, leaving other spending 
unaffected.  
2) Hold total taxes constant and pay for increased spending on item i by 
reducing spending on item j (or on several items) by an equivalent amount. 
 
Raise taxes to pay for extra spending on item i (ceteris paribus) 
Whenever marginal utility net of tax (i =i+5) is positive taxes should be increased 
to allow additional spending on item i. However, because the s are independent of 
expenditure levels, the linear utility function approximation cannot be used to 
identify how much additional tax should be raised to provide for increased spending 
on any item. 
 
Balanced Budget 
When spending on one item (Xj) is reduced to allow increased spending on another 
(Xi) with a balanced budget (dXj = -dXi), the change in utility is [From (1)]: 
jjii dXβdXβUd   
 
ji
i
ββ
dX
dU

  
 
In this case utility is maximized when spending is reallocated from the item with the 
smallest  to the item(s) with the largest . The same result is obtained when (3) is 
estimated. 
    j5ji5i dXββdXββUd     
     ji5j5i
i
ββββββ
dX
dU

  
 
All spending should be transferred to the item with the largest marginal utility net of 
tax (i). Inability to estimate (1) is not problematic for Policy 2. 
 
Table 2 provides estimates of differences in marginal utilities, along with 
significance tests derived using 10,000 replications in a Monte Carlo procedure 
described by Krinsky and Robb (1986).  
 
Table 2: Marginal utility differences 
Age 
 
Health - 
Environment 
Health - 
Education 
Education - 
Environment 
Environment - 
Support 
Health - 
Support 
Education - 
Support 
Model A 
n.a. 0.0040
***
 0.0026
**
 0.0014 0.014
***
 0.018
***
 0.015
***
 
Model D 
20 -0.0042
* 
-0.0053
** 
0.0011 0.034
***
 0.030
***
 0.035
***
 
30 -0.0014 -0.0027 0.0013 0.028
***
 0.026
***
 0.029
***
 
40 0.0014 0.0000 0.0014 0.021
***
 0.023
***
 0.023
***
 
50 0.0041
*** 
0.0026
* 
0.0016 0.015
*** 
0.019
*** 
0.017
*** 
60 0.0070
***
 0.0052
***
 0.0017 0.0092
***
 0.016
***
 0.011
***
 
70 0.0097
***
 0.0079
***
 0.0019 0.0030 0.013
***
 0.0049
**
 
Significance levels:   
*
 (10%), 
**
 (5%), 
***
 (1%) 
 
The coefficient differences (i - j) allow the items to be ranked. A positive 
difference indicates that spending on item i provides more utility at the margin than 
spending on item j. Welfare would be improved by transferring spending from item j 
to item i in such cases. Three coefficient differences in Model D are not significantly 
different from zero at the 95% confidence level, meaning that Model D is unable to 
rank reliably health, education and environment for a 50 year old, although it does 
indicate that marginal spending on any of these items provides more utility than 
spending on income support. 
 
For Model A it is possible to conclude that health spending provides more benefits 
than do either environment or education spending. The following hierarchy applies 
with better than 95% confidence: 
 
Net MUHealth > {Net MUEducation, Net MUEnvironment} > 0 > Net MUIncome Support 
 
While the marginal utility difference between education and the environment is not 
significantly different from zero, the models consistently rank MUEducation > 
MUEnvironment. 
 
The predictions from Model D vary significantly with respondent age (Table 2). 
Marginal utilities for health, education and the environment are larger than for 
income support for all age groups, except for 70 year olds who no longer have a clear 
preference for environmental spending over income support. There are no significant 
differences in marginal utility for spending on the environment and on education for 
any age group. However, younger respondents were more likely to value 
environmental and educational spending more highly than health spending. This 
outcome is consistent with Kemp & Burt (2001). 
 
Model B provides the opportunity to identify differences between people born in 
New Zealand and others (Table 3). Within these groups, relative willingness to spend 
on health and education in preference to the environment increases with age. This 
result is consistent with earlier models. New Zealand born respondents place a higher 
relative value on the environment than do those who were born overseas, with 
overseas born 70 year olds obtaining negative net benefits from additional 
environmental spending. 
 
Table 3: Model B expected marginal utility differences 
Age Born 
Health - 
Environment 
Education - 
Environment 
Environment - 
Support 
30 
NZ -0.00108 -0.00377
* 0.0195
***
 
Not NZ 0.00416 0.00147 0.0143
***
 
50 
NZ 0.00293
**
 0.000238 0.0155
***
 
Not NZ 0.00817
***
 0.00548
**
 0.0103
***
 
70 
NZ 0.00694
***
 0.00425
**
 0.0115
***
 
Not NZ 0.0122
***
 0.00948
***
 0.00625
**
 
Significance levels 
*
 (10%), 
**
 (5%), 
***
 (1%) 
Health –Support  0.0184***, Health – Education  0.00269**, Education – Support  0.0157*** 
 
 
Discussion 
 
An initial convergent validity test of choice experiment results is provided by 
comparison with Kemp’s findings. The highest marginal value ratings in New 
Zealand category rating studies are achieved by health, education and police (Kemp 
& Willetts, 1995a; Kemp, 1998, 2003; Kemp & Burt, 2001). These category rating 
studies rank the environment in the middle range, whereas spending on income 
support is always rated lowly. While the present study addresses a much narrower 
range of government services than the category rating studies, it indicates similar 
perceptions about the value of government services. Choice experiment results 
indicate preferences for reduced spending on income support, with the community 
signalling a strong desire to spend more on health, and being willing to support 
additional spending on education and the environment. Education and environment 
spending provide lower marginal benefits than health spending. The choice 
experiment and category rating studies are consistent in indicating a strong 
community preference for spending on health, education and the environment rather 
than on social security. 
 
A further test of convergent validity is provided by a budget game undertaken 
concurrently with the choice experiment (Hughey et al., 2002). Survey participants 
were informed of current government spending on six items and asked to identify 
their preferred budget allocation over those items, given that total expenditure could 
not change from the initial total of $30 billion per year. The budget items were 
slightly different to those in the choice experiment. Whereas the choice experiment 
addressed Income Support, the budget game contained a composite item 
Superannuation and Income Support, and referred to Conservation and the 
Environment rather than Conservation and Environmental Management that was 
addressed in the choice experiment. The budget game included the items defence and 
crime prevention which did not appear in the choice experiment. Balanced budget 
responses to the budget game question were provided by 564 respondents (67.5%). 
Table 4 summarises responses.  
 
Table 4: Preferred budget allocation changes 
 
Item 
 
2001 
spending 
($b) 
 
Preferred CHANGE in spending 
Minimum 
($b) 
Maximum 
($b) 
Median 
($b) 
Mean 
($b) 
SE Mean/
SE 
Defence 1 -1.0 14.0 0 0.141 0.049 2.88 
Education 7 -7.0 6.0 0 0.457 0.063 7.25 
Crime Prevention 1.5 -1.5 13.5 0 0.378 0.052 7.27 
Health 7 -7.0 13.0 0.5 0.892 0.076 11.74 
Superannuation 
& Income 
Support 
13 -13.0 2.0 -2.5 -2.903 0.135 -21.50 
Conservation & 
Environment 
0.5 -0.5 29.5 0.5 1.035 0.098 10.56 
Total 30    0.0000   
 
 
Preferred levels of spending in the budget game were all significantly different from 
actual expenditures at the time of the survey. Respondents wanted a substantial 
decrease in spending on superannuation and income support (95% confidence 
interval: $2.6 billion ~ $3.2 billion decrease). Increased spending was desired in all 
other categories, with the largest desired increase in spending being on conservation 
and the environment (95% confidence interval: $0.84 billion ~ $1.23 billion 
increase). Budget game participants also preferred a substantial increase in health 
spending. 
 
The choice model identifies marginal net benefits, whereas the budget game 
identifies the optimal budget allocation. Consequently, the magnitudes of preferred 
budget changes in the budget game cannot be directly compared with marginal 
benefit ranks from the choice model. However, the direction of preferred changes 
from the two approaches is consistent, with both signalling preferences for increased 
spending on health, education and the environment, and reduced spending on income 
support. 
 
Choice experiments have the potential to identify optimal budget allocations when 
non-linear utility functions are utilised. Results then could be compared directly with 
budget game outcomes. In this case, a second-order polynomial utility function was 
estimated, but showed no improvement over the simple linear model. This outcome 
may have arisen because of the relatively small changes in individual budget items in 
the choice sets.  
 
Initial tests of a logarithmic utility function show some promise (Kerr et al., 2003). 
Because of high correlations, the logarithmic model does not resolve the 
identification problem inherent in the linear and polynomial models for the case 
study. However, logarithmic utility function results mirrored those of the linear 
model - indicating efficiency benefits from transferring budget from income support 
to health, education and environment, with the bulk of reallocated funds going to 
health spending. The logarithmic utility function model has the ability to account for 
costs of service provision and illustrates that the community is willing to increase 
taxes to increase spending on health, education, and the environment.  
 
The collinearity problem may be surmountable by including additional spending 
items in the choice sets or increasing the number of attributes in the experimental 
design. In particular, the income support item used in the choice experiment may be 
too poorly defined because it incorporates a large number of sub-categories which 
may be judged quite differently. Disaggregation of income support may remove the 
high correlation between taxes and income support that precluded inclusion of both 
variables in the models. An alternative solution may rest in utilisation of alternative 
functional forms, which deserve further research investigation. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The choice experiment approach to identification of efficient budget allocation is 
novel. This application has been successful in that marginal utility differences 
between individual budget categories have been estimated within relatively narrow 
confidence intervals. The model has been less successful at measuring the marginal 
utility of spending on particular items. However, in theory, this can be done using 
non-linear utility functions.  
 
Choice experiment results pass initial convergent validity checks. The results 
obtained in the choice experiment, the budget game and the extensive evidence 
presented by Kemp and associates are in agreement. This weight of evidence 
suggests that the community would prefer less government spending on income 
support and increased spending on health, education and the environment. 
 
The potential to use choice experiments to identify marginal benefits as well as 
optimal budget allocations gives the choice experiment approach a theoretical 
advantage over category rating and budget games. Choice experiments have the 
ability to apply mathematical models of preference, which provides opportunities to 
statistically test the importance of demographic factors on preferences. Age and 
country of birth were shown to be significant in the case study. Choice experiments 
may have benefits in reducing response biases, although these have not been 
investigated in the current study.  
 
This initial trial of the choice approach to modelling community preferences, along 
with the potential advantages the approach offers, indicates the method has strong 
potential and suggests that further research into design improvements, advantages 
and limitations is warranted. 
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